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The authors construct in the article a consistent justification for dividing culture into material, social and 
spiritual. The opinion is substantiated that such a decomposition of culture in sociological discourse is 
supplemented by data from modern psychology, which speak in favor of just such a structure of human 
needs. The authors give the point of view that such a methodological solution to the problem is of the 
most general nature and requires further development and concretization, while they note that this 
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approach is promising, in particular, in that it makes it possible to transfer such a complex problem of 
the social sciences into the sphere of specific sociological research as a problem of values. It is quite 
obvious that social values are not arbitrary phenomena, but functions of human needs, and therefore can 
be investigated by empirical methods. 
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СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ДИСКУРС КУЛЬТУРЫ: ОПЫТ ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ 
 
Авторы выстраивают в статье последовательное обоснование деления культуры на 
материальную, социальную и духовную. Обосновывается мнение, что такая декомпозиция 
культуры в социологическом дискурсе дополняется данными современной психологии, которые 
говорят в пользу именно подобной  структуры потребностей человека. Авторы приводят точку 
зрения, что такое методологическое решение проблемы носит самый общий характер и требует 
дальнейшего развития и конкретизации, при этом они отмечают перспективность этого 
подхода, в частности, в том, что он позволяет перевести в сферу конкретно-социологических 
исследований такую сложнейшую проблему социальных наук, как проблему ценностей. 
Достаточно очевидно, что социальные ценности являются не произвольными феноменами, а 
функциями человеческих потребностей, и потому могут исследоваться и эмпирическими 
методами.  
 
Ключевые слова: социологический дискурс, культура, ценности, потребности человека, 
материальные потребности, духовные потребности, социальные потребности. 
 
 
The concept of culture as one of the most 
fruitful explanatory and initial principles was 
established in social science as a whole only 
after it proved its viability in the framework of 
the private social sciences – ethnography and 
ethnology, which initially studied only primitive 
societies. Europeans first became acquainted 
with these societies in the 15th-16th centuries, 
thanks to tectonic civilizational changes as a 
result of the initial experience of globalization, 
which later became known as the great 
geographical discoveries. Studying the 
numerous "primitive" societies that opened up 
for them (mainly in the New World) and 
descriptively comparing them with each other, 
as well as with the Western and Eastern societies 
known to them (as a starting point) of the Old 
World, European ethnographers and ethnologists 
were forced to gradually abandon many signs 
that were then included in their concept of 
society as necessary and, therefore, move 
towards the ultimate generalization of this 
concept. To do this, they needed to establish that 
minimum common, which would allow them to 
bring all these extremely different social 
systems, under a single concept-plateau of 
human society. And this concept for them 
eventually became the concept of culture. 
At the same time, one of the main difficulties 
for scientists of that time was (and in many 
respects still is) the fact that the concept of 
culture initially contains the meaning of 
something higher, standard, excellent and good, 
separating everything cultural from the 
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uncultured as something then inferior, unworthy 
and bad. In other words, the concept of culture 
initially contains an axiological moment that 
greatly complicates its functional use in a purely 
descriptive, objective sense. And it is not so easy 
to get rid of this feature of the concept and the 
term “culture”, as modern practice also shows. 
And even M. Weber in his sociology proceeded 
from the axiom that “the concept of culture is a 
value concept” [1]. 
As you know, the ancient Greeks, in their 
scientific reflection, acutely felt and realized the 
difference between their society and all the other 
peoples surrounding it, which almost a priori 
were considered by the Greeks to be “barbaric” 
societies. Moreover, they included not only the 
Scythians, Gauls, Germans and other peoples 
who were then still at the preliterate and pre-
state level of their development, but even the 
Persians, despite the fact, had created by that 
time the greatest (in all respects) empire in The 
Middle East, as well as the Romans, who 
eventually subjugated the entire ancient world, 
including the Greeks themselves. Only in 
relation to the Egyptians (and this is 
understandable !!) did the Greeks have some 
doubts, since they were forced to recognize 
many cultural borrowings they had made from 
this ancient society. Contact with the Egyptian 
civilization significantly advanced the technical 
and scientific thought of Ancient Greece itself. 
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, the 
division of all peoples and societies into 
Hellenic and barbaric was considered a kind of 
unshakable social axiom throughout antiquity. 
Numerous wars fueled this dichotomy, rooting 
in the minds of the inhabitants of the polis "the 
alienation of the other." In particular, the Greek 
geographer Strabo, who already lived at the turn 
of the ancient and Christian eras, noted, as a 
matter of course, "that some peoples are 
dominated by law, statehood and dignity 
associated with education and sciences, while 
others are opposite" [2]. Another culture was 
perceived as an under-culture, because its codes 
and symbols were incomprehensible and not 
accepted. And in this indication one can already 
see one of the first attempts to give a clear 
definition, if not the very concept of culture (in 
the modern sense), then the very close to it 
concept of civilization, which, for example, was 
used by French scientists in this sense even in 
the days of E. Durkheim (and himself) [3]. The 
Greeks and the late Romans themselves 
designated this phenomenon with the term 
"morals", "morality", due to the broad 
understanding of morality since the time of 
Aristotle. 
Christianity, which then replaced the Greek 
culture, adopted many ancient stereotypes and 
"ideologemes", preserved and preserved this 
distinction, which was expressed among 
Christians in the form of the antithesis 
"Christianity – paganism". The latter for 
Christians was synonymous with barbarism and 
carried all the traditional negative connotations 
characteristic of this ancient word. When the 
Europeans discovered new even more 
"primitive" societies, a new reality appeared that 
was not described by these terms, the words 
"barbarism" or "paganism" became functionally 
insufficient, and then the word "savagery" was 
introduced into circulation , denoting the lowest 
stage of cultural development, at which people, 
according to the researchers of that time, are 
almost indistinguishable from animals (animals). 
Therefore, at first the Europeans tended to 
regard savages as creatures almost completely 
devoid of any culture, as something generally 
uncultured. This explains the cruelty, practically 
not condemned by anyone, in the treatment of 
peoples, whose fault was only that the 
unacceptability and unreadiness of their cultural 
symbols led to the fact that they fell into the 
indicated matrix. And it was at this (largely 
tragic) stage that initially ethnography and then 
ethnology were formed in Europe as sciences 
that study precisely the “savages”, that is, 
“wild”, “uncultured” peoples. 
However, the further development of these 
sciences quickly enough led the scientists who 
were engaged in them to a rather trivial idea that 
it is generally impossible to talk about the "lack 
of culture" of wild peoples, since in fact they 
have exactly the same culture as all "civilized" 
peoples, only - less developed. But the very 
essence and structure of their, even if, primitive 
culture is fully comparable with the structure of 
all more developed cultures, and the general 
patterns of functioning and development of 
primitive cultures are essentially the same as for 
highly developed cultures. As a result, by the 
end of the 19th century ethnologists (mainly 
British and American, among whom F. Boas 
stands out in this respect) substantiated the key 
provisions of the general concept of the so-
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called "cultural relativism", according to which 
the culture (cultures) of all societies should be 
studied as absolutely equal and equal. This 
concept was quickly recognized and developed 
also in Russian social science at that time. “The 
moment of evaluation,” wrote, for example, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century the 
famous Russian linguist and sociologist N.S. 
Trubetskoy, – must be expelled from ethnology 
and the history of culture once and for all ... 
There are no higher and lower. There are only 
similar and dissimilar. It is arbitrary, 
unscientific, naive, and, finally, simply stupid to 
declare those who are similar to us superior, and 
those who are unlike those who are inferior” [4]. 
On this basis, it happened then – already in 
the first half of the twentieth century – the 
transfer (dissemination) of ideas and methods of 
studying society, developed initially in 
ethnography and ethnology, to sociology as a 
whole, including empirical methods of studying 
modern societies. For the first time and with 
particular success, this was done by the founders 
of the famous Chicago school of sociologists in 
the United States (W. Thomas, F. Znanetsky, R. 
Park, E. Burgess, etc.), which was greatly 
facilitated then by the social itself 
("multicultural" or even patchwork ) the 
situation prevailing by that time in this fast-
growing industrial city. 
On the other hand, this natural extension of 
the concept of culture to the entire field of social 
sciences turned it into one of the fundamental 
principles of all social cognition in general and 
contributed to the emergence and development 
of a special general theoretical (or socio-
philosophical) science – cultural studies, which 
began to claim the role of a general 
methodology of social knowledge in general. 
And in this capacity, cultural studies first of all 
entered into confrontation with the paradigm of 
"historical materialism" put forward for 
substantiation in the 19th century by K. Marx, F. 
Engels and their followers, as a rule, left 
discourse, which, due to the historical realities of 
that time, the emphasis was placed on the study 
of the material side of social life, the basis. 
Culturology, on the other hand, focused on the 
study of primarily the spiritual side of social life, 
and in this sense, it acted as an antithesis to 
Marxism. As the most significant achievement 
of this (culturalistic or culture-centric) approach, 
one can consider, in particular, the sociology of 
M. Weber [1] (although he himself, of course, 
did not explicitly define his approach as a 
cultural one). 
However, if we compare both of these 
approaches in terms of clarity and clarity of their 
initial concepts and principles, then the 
comparison will not be in favor of cultural 
studies. And first of all, this refers to the most 
key concept of the culturological approach – to 
the concept of culture. The classical and 
historically first clear definition of this concept 
is considered to be the formulation proposed 
back in 1871 by the outstanding British 
ethnologist (anthropologist) E.B. Tylor. 
“Culture, or civilization,” he wrote, “in a broad 
ethnographic sense, is composed in its entirety 
of knowledge, beliefs, art, morality, laws, 
customs and some other abilities and habits 
assimilated by a person as a member of society” 
[5]. 
The most important points of this definition 
are, first, an indication that culture is something 
assimilated by an individual after his birth; and, 
secondly, it is an indication of what society, first 
of all, endows a person with culture. From birth, 
people do not have any culture, but at the same 
time they will have the culture that this or that 
particular society will be able to endow them 
with. Thus, society is recognized as the primary 
bearer and custodian of culture, and not an 
individual person (the latter also becomes a 
bearer of culture, but only after he receives it 
from the society in which he was formed). 
For all the clarity and clarity of this 
definition, its obvious drawback is that it does 
not allow us to concretize the concept of culture 
into the concept of material culture, which is 
fundamentally different, for example, from 
spiritual culture, while this most important 
distinction is almost as ancient. as well as the 
very concept of culture. Tylor's definition refers 
only to the mental-psychological (and partly 
social) nature of culture and therefore is well 
suited for the study of the spiritual and social 
culture of the individual and society. An attempt 
to bring the concept of material culture under it 
also causes severe difficulties. Therefore, it is no 
coincidence that this definition has been 
subjected to largely fair criticism from the very 
moment of its introduction into scientific 
circulation, and attempts have been made to 
improve it in this direction. 
One of the most successful and original such 
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attempts belongs to the famous American 
scientist, anthropologist L. White, who for the 
first time proposed the very name for this new 
science, due to which he received well-founded 
recognition as the founder of cultural studies. 
“Those who define culture as ideas, abstractions 
or as behavior,” wrote L. White, “are logically 
inevitably forced to admit that material objects 
are not culture and cannot be. "Strictly 
speaking," says Gebel, "material culture is not 
culture at all." Tylor goes even further: "The 
concept of 'material culture' is erroneous," 
because "culture is a purely mental 
phenomenon." Beals and Hoijer: "Culture is an 
abstraction of behavior and should not be 
confused with real acts of behavior or with 
material objects such as tools ..." The denial of 
material culture, says L. White, looks ridiculous 
from the point of view of the traditions of 
ethnographers, archaeologists, museum workers 
of old instruments, masks, fetishes and other 
"material culture. “Our definition, – he asserts, – 
leads away from this dilemma” [6]. 
Before further citing L. White's original 
definition of culture, let us first note that all the 
"cultural objects" (artifacts) he listed above are, 
of course, directly related to culture, but, at the 
same time, to spiritual culture and not material. 
Leslie White is absolutely right in trying to 
defend the very concept of material culture, but 
he does it, in our opinion, completely 
unsuccessfully, namely, he tries to offer material 
things as material culture. But this, from the 
point of view of social science, is a 
misunderstanding. Material things can relate to 
both material and spiritual culture, but this 
belonging is not determined by what they are 
made of. For example, an amphora, Hercules or 
Zeus can be sculpted from the same clay. The 
point is not in their matter itself, but in 
something else (which will be discussed in the 
final part of our analysis) in the symbolization 
and axiology of the act of the act itself. 
 Let us now consider the definition of culture 
proposed by L. White. “As we have already 
shown,” he writes, “culture” refers to a certain 
order or class of phenomena, namely, objects 
and phenomena associated with the 
manifestation of a special mental ability inherent 
exclusively to the human species, the ability to 
symbolize. More precisely, culture consists of 
material objects – tools, utensils, ornaments, 
amulets, etc., actions, beliefs and relationships 
that function in a symbolic context. It is a 
complex extrasomatic mechanism that a certain 
species of animals – man – uses in the struggle 
for survival and existence” [6]. 
But here for those wishing to understand the 
essence of White's approach, the unusual 
difficulty arises, which is due to the very 
specifically American use of the words 
"symbol", "symbolization", "to symbolize", 
"symbolic", etc. Throughout the world, for a 
long time, this verbal series denotes phenomena 
associated with the use of a special kind of signs 
by people, in which some objects are given the 
ability to represent (represent) some abstract 
qualities naturally associated with these objects. 
For example, a lion or an eagle among many 
Western peoples are symbols of royalty, 
domination; an owl is a symbol of wisdom; heart 
is a symbol of love, etc. However, in American 
literature, especially sociological and cultural, 
the word "symbolization", from the time of one 
of the founders of American sociology – J. Mead 
(and with his submission) began to be given 
such a broad meaning that it practically began to 
replace (for Americans) the words 
"thinking","mind","consciousness " etc. Even a 
whole trend of sociological thought, which is 
based on the recognition of the rationality of 
human behavior and the conditionality of this 
rationality of any human actions, institutions, 
etc., has received, thanks to this, specifically 
American scientific jargon, the confusing name 
of "symbolic interactionism", which is Russian 
is simply translated as "meaningful interaction", 
"intelligent behavior and relationships of 
people." Therefore, when L. White tells us that 
culture is "a certain order or class of phenomena 
... associated with the manifestation of the 
ability to symbolize inherent exclusively to the 
human species," he only wants to say that 
culture is always a product of human thinking, 
human mind, not a given or a heritage of nature. 
Animals don't think, so they don't have any 
culture either. But at the same time (according to 
White's approach) the society itself, which is the 
bearer and custodian of culture, receives it 
thanks to the rationality of its members and their 
ability to make their personal contribution to this 
culture common to all of them (Ortega y 
Gasset). Not only does society endow its 
members with culture, but they also develop and 
improve this culture with their work and the 
efforts of their mind. 
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And in such a semantic interpretation, L. 
White's concept appears as clear as it is 
traditional for the entire European (Western) 
scientific culture in general. And at the same 
time, it significantly improves and promotes E. 
Tylor's concept. In contrast to the latter, L. 
White suggests considering culture as a specific 
form in which society exists and develops. 
People and things represent the matter of 
society, and culture is a specific form into which 
this matter is organized in the process of its real 
existence. Thus, White for the first time in social 
science gives culture not only epistemological, 
but also ontological status, which radically 
changes the optics of cultural studies. 
However, modern cultural studies, as you 
know, recognizing L. White as the founder of 
this science, did not accept at the same time his 
concept in its entirety. And therefore, the most 
popular definition of culture among 
culturologists (and sociologists) is still the one 
that belongs to other authoritative American 
authors in this area of knowledge – A. Kroeber 
and K. Klachon, who think, however, rather in 
the tradition of E. Tylor than L. White. 
“Culture,” they write, “consists of internally 
contained and externally manifested norms that 
determine behavior learned and mediated 
through symbols; it arises as a result of human 
activity, including its embodiment in means. The 
essential core of culture is made up of traditional 
(historically formed) ideas, primarily those that 
are attributed with special value. Cultural 
systems can be considered, on the one hand, as 
the results of human activity, and on the other, 
as its regulators ” [7]. 
 Unfortunately, it is precisely this 
understanding of culture that currently 
dominates in most Russian textbooks on cultural 
studies and sociology of culture [8]. But the 
objection to it remains the same – it is not 
functional, does not allow a satisfactory 
definition of culture in the concept of material 
culture, without which any understanding of 
society in the mainstream of this approach will 
always not only yield to the Marxist approach to 
it, but also simply show its inferiority [9]. L. 
White understood this well, but this 
understanding, due to the "new" attitudes, is 
practically lost among modern culturologists, 
which undoubtedly impoverishes and narrows its 
(culturology) methodological potential [10]. 
In Russian cultural studies, the closest to L. 
White's concept is the theory developed since 
the 70s of the last century by M.S. Kagan, 
which, unfortunately, has such an abstract 
(philosophical) and ponderous character that it 
practically defies its direct interpretation in 
terms of the sociology of culture [11]. In support 
of this idea, we present here an extremely 
abbreviated definition of culture, offered by an 
undoubtedly very profound author [12]. 
In the philosophical analysis of culture, 
writes M.S. Kagan – appears before us ... as 
such a form of being, which is formed by human 
activity, covering: 
a) the qualities of the person himself as a 
subject of activity are supernatural qualities; 
b) those methods, activities that are not 
innate to a person – neither a species nor an 
individual, but which are invented by him, 
improved and passed from generation to 
generation, thanks to training, education, 
upbringing; 
c) a variety of objects – material, spiritual, 
artistic, – in which the processes of activity are 
objectified, which become a "second nature", 
created from the material of the "first", genuine 
nature in order to satisfy supernatural, 
specifically human needs and serve the 
transmitter of this human principle to other 
people; 
d) secondary methods, activities that no 
longer serve to objectify, but to de-objectify 
those human qualities that are stored in the 
objective existence of culture; 
e) again a person, whose second role in 
culture is due to the fact that in the process of 
de-objectification he grows, changes, enriches, 
develops, in short, becomes a product of culture; 
f) the connection between the processes of 
objectification and de-objectification with the 
communication of the people participating in 
them as a special aspect of human activity and, 
accordingly, a phenomenon of culture ... This is 
how the “circle of culture” is closed, – the 
author sums up, – its movement from person to 
person, mediated by the object that he creates-
tyu “[13]. 
It is obvious that it is extremely difficult (if 
not impossible) to translate this overcomplicated 
philosophical understanding into any minimal 
set of “instrumental” concepts, a system of 
operationally interpreted terms that could guide 
a sociologist in his field (and theoretical) 
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research. But serious objections can be raised to 
the conceptual side of this understanding. 
First, the definition of culture as a “form of 
being” is too broad, and to go from it 
immediately to “human activity”, which 
supposedly “forms” this “form of being”, means 
to make too wide a leap in thinking, which can 
be traced in details are almost impossible. 
Secondly, referring to culture only 
“supernatural human qualities” and objects 
(artifacts) designed to satisfy “only supernatural, 
specifically human needs” is obviously 
incorrect, since all this reduces culture, in fact, 
to only one spiritual culture, and there is no 
room for material culture. 
Finally, thirdly, the division of all “cultural 
objects” into “material, spiritual and artistic” 
also proceeds from an incorrect (or not entirely 
correct) idea of objectivity in general. There are 
no separate material, spiritual and artistic 
objects, but in all real objects involved in the life 
of society, one can distinguish between their 
material (material) and spiritual sides, and the 
artistic side of material objects from time 
immemorial has been traditionally attributed to 
the spiritual, and not to something. Then the 
third, existing independently of the material and 
spiritual and along with them. 
At the same time, an extremely valuable side 
of M.S. Kagan sees his understanding of human 
activity not abstractly, but as a form of activity 
aimed at satisfying certain needs. Although this 
understanding is not explicitly expressed in the 
texts of the author himself (and, perhaps, he is 
not even fully aware of it), nevertheless the very 
logic of his reasoning leads to just such an 
understanding. 
In accordance with this, a brief definition of 
culture, in our opinion, can be formulated as 
follows. Culture is a specifically human way of 
life, the essence of which is the constant 
development (invention), storage and 
transmission to more and more generations of 
people of specifically human forms, methods 
and objects of activity aimed at satisfying human 
needs, both specific to him (spiritual) and he has 
in common with animals in general and “social 
animals” in particular [14]. 
At the same time, the material culture 
includes those aspects of a person’s social life 
that “serve” the “material” (or vital) needs of a 
person, which he has in common with animals. 
These needs are innate to humans as well as to 
any animal. But, unlike the latter, nature does 
not determine any specific forms, objects and 
methods of their satisfaction for a person, and a 
person must find (invent) them on his own. 
What he finds in this respect (develops) in the 
process of his development, and constitutes his 
material culture. 
Spiritual culture includes those aspects of 
human social life that “serve” his specific needs, 
which animals do not have. These needs are also 
innate (invested) in a person, since a person is 
endowed with reason precisely from nature, and 
not from education or training. And his mind has 
its needs as well as the body (soma). It is 
empirically clear that the needs of the mind are 
satisfied by three main forms of spiritual activity 
– scientific (cognitive), religious and artistic. 
Finally, social culture includes those aspects 
of a person’s social life that “serve” the needs of 
people in each other. These needs are also 
present in many animals, referred to as the so-
called “social animals.” Although, strictly 
speaking, “non-social” animals do not exist at 
all, since sexual dimorphism gives rise to the 
need for specific (sexual) communication in 
individuals of almost any species. However, in 
“social animals”, to which man also biologically 
belongs, this need (or these needs) is developed 
to the maximum extent. The long-term 
helplessness of children alone indicates the 
enormous role of social needs in human society. 
These needs are also innate to man, since man is 
by nature a social being. 
The empirical substantiation of the proposed 
by us three-term division of culture into 
material, social and spiritual can be the data of 
modern psychology, which speak in favor of just 
such a structure of human needs [15]. So, with 
all the twists and turns of scientific fashion (and 
this is also recorded by sociologists), the 
currently most recognized theory of needs, 
developed by the famous American psychologist 
A. Maslow, distinguishes the following types of 
them (built by Maslow himself in a hierarchical 
order from lowest to highest): 
1. Physiological needs (food, water, air, rest, 
sleep). 
2. Security needs. 
3. Needs for love and belonging. 
4. Needs for respect. 
5. The need for self-actualization. 
6. The need for knowledge and 
understanding. 
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7. Aesthetic needs. 
Without going into the discussion of 
correctness (there are remarks to it) of the very 
hierarchy of needs proposed by Maslow, we 
note only that the first and second rubrics 
contain vital (“material”) needs that are satisfied 
with the help of physical things. The third and 
fourth sections contain social needs that are 
satisfied only in the course of communication 
with other people. The fifth, sixth and seventh 
sections contain an indication of spiritual needs. 
Essentially, the same classification of needs 
is accepted by the community of Russian 
scientists. In particular, in the work of one of the 
most authoritative Russian authors in this area 
[16], we find the following classification of 
needs: 
1. Material needs (food, clothing, housing). 
2. Spiritual needs (for knowledge and 
understanding, for aesthetic pleasure, for 
creativity). 
3. Social needs (for communication, for 
work, for recognition, etc.). 
Thus, the division of culture we propose can 
be considered quite empirically grounded. 
Of course, our proposed solution to the 
problem is of a very general nature and requires 
further development and concretization. But we 
see the promise of this approach, in particular, in 
the fact that it allows us to transfer into the 
sphere of specific sociological research such a 
complex problem of the social sciences as the 
problem of values. It is quite obvious, in 
particular, that social values are not arbitrary 
phenomena, but functions of human needs, and 
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